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Contingent Fees for Legal Services. By F. B. MAcKINNON.
Aldine Publishing Co., 1964. Pp. 246. $6.00.

Chicago:

The most important recent developments as to the profession of law
have been directed to providing a lawyer when needed. For thirty years
past, emphasis has been given to the provision of counsel for indigents

accused of crime, with the case of Gideon v. Wainwright' as the climax,
though not the end, of the struggle. This emphasis, needed though it is,
has somewhat obscured the facts that most persons needing legal services
are not indigents and that most legal matters are not criminal cases or
even court cases at all. There is no less need for attention to the provision of counsel for these other persons and matters. Consideration is
made urgent by the recent decisions in the Button 2 and Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen3 cases which upset traditional standards of the bar.
The method of financing legal services is a major aspect of any form
of providing them. The possible sources of financing are two, each with
subdivisions and possible combinations. One source is outside the parties
and the case, as private groups or public monies. The second is the parties
themselves, whether from their independent means or the case. The contingent fee is a method by which a claimant may finance the provision of
legal services from the proceeds of the case itself. It is an application of
quantum meruit to the lawyer, as Dean Griswold explained to an English
4
audience.
The contingent fee system may be this country's most distinctive contribution to the methods of providing legal services. It is "a uniquely
American development which has evolved in the face of an historical
position (still held by most countries) that its use is contrary to the public
interest, unprofessional, and even criminal." It has been denounced as
the source of gross abuses. It has been lauded as essential to the enforcement of just claims. It has been upheld, too, as affording the financial
support necessary to the maintenance of an independent segment of the
1 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
3 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1
(1964).
4 Griswold, Two Branches of the Same Stream (Third Maccabean Lecture in Jurisprudence), 14 HARv. L. ScH. BULL. 4, 5 (No. 4, 1963).
5 P. 209.
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bar who are free of the trammels of the establishment, whether economic
or governmental or institutional, and who can furnish unhampered
public criticism in changing times. If this last justification, especially, is
valid, it is of great social importance that the system be freed of abuses
which, unless corrected, would threaten the existence of the system itself.
There was need for a thorough and dispassionate study of the subject,
which Mr. MacKinnon has given in this excellent report of the American
Bar Foundation.
The subtitle of the volume indicates the purpose and direction of the
volume, "A Study of Professional Economics and Responsibilities." The
first of its four parts sets the discussion in the context of the development
of fees in England and the United States. As the Supreme Court of the
United States did in a case last year, 6 the book contrasts the English
policy on discouraging litigation through imposing the costs of litigation
on the losing party, with the American policy of encouraging litigation
through the imposition of only minor court charges on a defeated litigant
and of making litigation feasible for claimants through the use of contingent fees. The second and third parts treat two contemporary matters,
the law of contingent fees and their importance in financing legal services.
The last part is the author's evaluation of contingent fees as measured by
their fairness and their effect on professional responsibilities. To aid the
reader in forming his own judgment there are appended sample forms of
contingent fee contracts, the detailed regulations in two of the Judicial
Departments of New York, and a bibliography. A helpful foreword by
Dean E. Blythe Stason, the former Administrator of the American Bar
Foundation, describes Mr. MacKinnon's book as a part of the Foundation's program for continuing the Survey of the Legal Profession. Written
with insight and judgment and clarity, the book is indispensable to any
thoughtful consideration of the subject whether by the bar or the courts
or the legislature.
A few of the author's conclusions will be indicated. For the bulk of
litigation in trial courts of general jurisdiction the contingent fee is the
principal method of remuneration for the plaintiff's counsel. In some
administrative proceedings the method has an even more dominant position. Yet for a substantial proportion of the members of the legal profession who are at or near the top in terms of income and prestige the
contingent fee system is of slight importance, which may explain why so
little careful consideration has been given to it.
Dangers inherent in the system may call for controls, which are now
more usual with administrative tribunals than with the courts. An important control is self-limitation by lawyers.
6 Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227 (1964).
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This professional self-limitation is a safety factor or governor on
the machinery of fee-setting which is overlooked by many observers, who view with understandable alarm the prospect of
routine application of rates providing for 1/8 or 1/2 of the re-7
covery to attorneys, when the recovery is large (above $50,000).
The evidence provided in two studies, by the Philadelphia Bar Association and by the Columbia Law School, shows that the average fee charged
was lower than the allowed maximum.
If the contingent fee were abolished or severely limited, other methods
of financing the plaintiff's litigation would have to be found, and some
alternative methods are discussed. Among them are "institutionalized
legal services," the development of which was opened by the Button and
Brotherhood cases.8
Mr. MacKinnon's book sets a high standard in the work of the profession of law.
ELLIoTr
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7 P. 188.
s See notes 2-3 supra.
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.

Justice Daniel Dissenting: A Biography of Peter V. Daniel, 1784-1860.
By JOHN P. FRANK. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964. Pp.

xii, 336. $7.95.
Justice Peter V. Daniel served on the United States Supreme Court from
1841 to 1859. He was in many respects a nineteenth century James C.
McReynolds, though McReynolds, unlike Daniel, could be a charming
person when it suited his whims. As a man Daniel was a boor. Deep down
he was a human being of decent emotions, but he was also compulsively
honest, devoid of humor, verbose, endlessly contentious, a carper at the
faults of others who was hypersensitive to criticism of himself. Even his
friends apparently lacked any real warmth or affection for him, complaining of his "frozen deportment." In the bosom of his family, Daniel played
the role of a fussbudgetty, overly paternalistic, lovingly tyrannical
patriarch. Frank sums up the Justice's character as "sadly subject to the
vices of pettiness and arrogance and to an insufferable self-righteousness." u
As a politician, Daniel's main attribute was a tenacious ability to
ding to state office. In the early 1800's he had a brief and "utterly undistinguished career" 2 in the Virginia legislature; then 'from 1812 to

I

P. 234.

2 P. 11.

